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not, as far as I can tell, assume exhaustiveness and exclusive-
ness. These include the Index of Institutionalized Ethnicity
(IEI), proposed by Lieberman and Singh in this symposium
(Lieberman and Singh 2008), ECI, proposed by Steven Wilkinson
(Chandra and Wilkinson 2008), among others.
What is an Ethnic “Group”?
The Oxford English Dictionary associates the word
“group” with two meanings: “A number of people or things
regarded as forming a unity or whole on the grounds of some
mutual or common relation or purpose,” or “classed together
because of a degree of similarity.” The second meaning sug-
gests that those who belong to a group simply share member-
ship in a category—a descriptive label that describes and dis-
tinguishes them from others regardless of their own feelings
on the matter. The first meaning suggests that those who share
group membership not only share a descriptive label but also
think of themselves as a collective with a shared conscious-
ness.
The identities that comparative political sciences classify
as ethnic are often no more than descriptive categories—but
our theories, often unjustifiably, associate members of these
categories with a shared collective consciousness (Brubaker
2004). In my own work, and in the course of this article, I treat
an ethnic identity purely as a descriptive category and try to
avoid using the ambiguous term “group” altogether.  But when
referring to the usage of other comparative political scientists
who do use the word “group,” I also follow suit, trying either
to clarify what I think it means in the work from which it is
drawn or consider all possible interpretations of what it could
mean.
By an “ethnic” category, I mean a category in which mem-
bership depends on a subset of descent-based attributes. All
categories based on descent-based attributes, according to
this definition, are not ethnic identity categories. And some
non-ethnic identities also require descent-based rules for mem-
bership. But all ethnic identities require some descent-based
attributes for membership. This definition captures the classi-
fication of ethnic identities in comparative politics to a greater
degree than the alternatives (for elaboration, see Chandra 2006,
2007).
Nominal ethnic identities are those ethnic identity cat-
egories in which an individual’s descent-based attributes make
her eligible for membership. Activated ethnic identities are
those ethnic categories in which she actually professes mem-
bership or to which she is assigned membership by others. All
individuals have a repertoire of nominal ethnic identities from
which one or more may be activated.2
 The ethnic “structure” of a population consists of all the
repertoires of nominal ethnic identity categories of all indi-
viduals in that population—and the attributes from which these
nominal categories are generated (for elaboration, see Chandra
2009 and Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Suppose, in an ex-
ample to which I will return throughout this article, individuals
in a population are characterized by two types of skin colour:
black and white. And suppose that they are characterized by
two places of origin: foreign and native (Chandra and Boulet
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A great deal of new work in the field of ethnic politics has
focused on improving the quality of the data we put into our
measures—and critiquing the quality of the data that went
into measures such as the Index of Ethnolinguistic Fractional-
ization (the ELF index) (Chandra 2009, Chandra and Wilkinson
2008, Cederman and Girardin 2007, Posner 2004).1
In this article, I shift the focus to improving the quality of
the assumptions that drive our measures. The ELF index and
many of the new measures which have followed it are based on
the assumptions that the ethnic categories that describe a popu-
lation are mutually exclusive. But the membership of one eth-
nic category, whether nominal or activated, often overlaps with
the membership of another. I refer to this as the problem of
“overlap.” The ELF index and some additional measures also
assume that the ethnic categories that describe a population
are exhaustive. But it is often the case that only a part of popu-
lation can be categorized in ethnic terms. I refer to this as the
problem of “incompleteness.” Quite apart from improving the
quality of the data that they describe, improving the quality of
our measures requires us to improve the quality of our as-
sumptions to take these problems into account.
I then introduce one new measure of the activation of
ethnic identities by political parties—EVOTE—that does not
employ the assumptions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness.
EVOTE is drawn from a time-series cross-national dataset that
I am currently in the process of constructing (referred to here-
after as CDEI (Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institu-
tions). CDEI collects data on ethnic categories activated in
competitive politics by political parties and the institutional
context in which such politicization takes place. The full do-
main of CDEI is all countries that held at least one lower-house
legislative election in any of three decades: 1976–1986, 1986–
1996, and 1996–2006. The data and examples in this article
however, are taken from the 1986–1996 cross-section. They
describe a hundred countries which held a party-based elec-
tion for the lower-house of the legislature between 1986 and
1996.
EVOTE is only one of many measures that are or could be
designed without making the restrictive assumptions of exclu-
siveness and exhaustiveness. Other such measures we are
developing in CDEI include measures of the effective number
of ethnic parties, of the degree of dispersion of ethnic group
vote across ethnic parties that represent it, of the degree of
inclusion of ethnic parties in government, and of the dimen-
sions to which ethnic categories activated by political parties
belong. These were introduced and discussed at a workshop,
“Measuring Ethnicity,” held at New York University in Octo-
ber 2008. Other scholars are also developing measures that do
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2006). These attributes can generate a very large number of
nominal categories, including “Blacks” (consisting of those
individuals with the attribute-repertoires black and foreign or
black and native), “Whites” (consisting of those individuals
with the attribute-repertoires white and foreign or white and
native), “White Natives” (consisting only of those individuals
who are both white skinned and native), “Foreigners” (con-
sisting of those individuals who are either white skinned and
foreign or black skinned and foreign), “Black Natives” (con-
sisting only of those individuals who are both black skinned
and native), and so on. All these nominal categories belong to
this population’s ethnic “structure” whether or not anyone
actually identifies with them.
By ethnic “practice,” I mean those categories actually ac-
tivated by a country’s population in a specific context. The
context can vary: the categories activated in party politics can
be different from categories activated in voting behaviour and
both can be different from categories activated in private life.
Suppose, for instance, that in the population above, individu-
als who have the attributes of black skin and a foreign place of
origin) describe themselves as “Black” during elections—al-
though they also qualify for membership in the nominal cat-
egories of “Foreigner” or “Black Foreigner,” these are  not the
ones in which they declare membership. We would then term
the category “Black” as the activated category in this context.
The Assumptions of Mutual Exclusiveness and
Exhaustiveness in the ELF Index and Other Measures
The ELF Index is calculated according to the formula 1–
   si
2, where si is the proportion of the ith activated ethnic
category, i={1, 2, …..n}. This formula requires the ethnic cat-
egories to be mutually exclusive (i.e., if you are in ethnic cat-
egory 1, you are not in ethnic categories 2–n) and exhaustive
(every member of the population is in some ethnic category).
Given mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, this index
measures the probability that two randomly chosen individu-
als from a country’s population belong to different groups.
Thus, a society with two groups, a majority of 80% and a
minority of 20%, would have an ELF score of 1–(.64+.04) = .32.
A society with several small groups of 25% each would have
a higher ELF score of 1–(.0625+.0625+.0625+.0625) = .75. In
the absence of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness, this
measure would be meaningless: it would no longer measure
the probability that two randomly chosen individuals from a
country’s population belong to different groups.
The Problem of Overlap
The “attributes” from which a country’s nominal or acti-
vated ethnic categories are generated can indeed be arrayed
on one or more mutually exclusive attribute dimensions. Thus,
if we define as “foreign” as anyone whose parents were born
outside the boundaries of a country, and “native” as all those
whose parents were not born outside the country, we have a
mutually exclusive attribute dimension of place of origin where
everyone is either foreign or native. If there are people who
don’t quite fit, we can simply place them in a residual value.”3
But the ELF index and related measures purport to de-
scribe the ethnic identity categories that characterize a popu-
lation—not the attributes from which they are generated.
These categories are often not mutually exclusive. To illus-
trate, consider first the nominal categories in our hypothetical
example above. Some of these categories such as “Black” and
“White,” indeed have mutually exclusive memberships, be-
cause the attributes that qualify individuals for membership in
each—the attribute of “black” skin for the category Black and
the attribute of “white” skin for the category White—are mu-
tually exclusive by definition. But many others are not. Con-
sider the categories White (consisting of those individuals
with the attribute-repertoires white and foreign or white and
native) and “White Natives” (consisting only of those indi-
viduals who are both white skinned and native). These cat-
egories have overlapping memberships: given their attributes,
those who are White can also be described as “White and
Native.”
The real world is full of such examples. The United States
is perhaps the closest example to the hypothetical case above.
Nominal ethnic identity categories in the US include “White,”
“Black,” “WASP,” “Immigrant,” “Irish-American,” “Latino,”
“Catholic,” “West Indian,” and so on.  The categories “White”
and “WASP” overlap, as do the categories “White,” “Irish-
American,” and “Catholic.” The categories “Black,” “Catho-
lic,” and “West Indian” overlap too.  So do the categories
“Immigrant,” “Black,” “Irish-American” and “Latino.” We could
reproduce examples of such overlap when surveying the eth-
nic structure of most countries.
Suppose the term “group” refers to the activated catego-
ries embedded in a population’s ethnic “practice.” There is no
logical reason to expect individuals to activate only mutually
exclusive categories—and we do not so far have a theory that
makes such a prediction. In our hypothetical example, sup-
pose that individuals activate the categories “Foreign,” “Black,”
and “White Native.” These categories have overlapping mem-
berships: some of those who have the attributes for member-
ship in the category “Foreign” also qualify for membership in
the category “Black.”
Indeed, at least judging from CDEI data on ethnic practice
in party politics, overlapping categories routinely show up in
party politics. Very occasionally, we do find cases in which
activated categories belong to a category-dimension. In
Guyana, for instance, the two activated categories in our data—
Afro-Guyanese and East Indian—could be said to be mutually
exclusive and belong to a single dimension based on region of
origin. But these are exceptions that prove the rule. In most of
the 100 countries that we study, the ethnic categories acti-
vated do not belong to any commonsensical family. CDEI’s
count of politically activated ethnic categories in India, for
instance, produces the following categories: Hindu, Muslim,
Sikh, OBCs, Scheduled Castes, Jharkhandis, Assamese, and
Tamils. The categories Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh belong to the
attribute-dimension of religion, the category OBC and Sched-
uled Caste belong to the attribute-dimension of caste, the cat-
egories Assamese and Tamils belong to the coinciding dimen-
sions of region and language, and the category Jharkhandi
belongs to the dimension of subregion.  Many of them overlap
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ethnic structure, then they can in many instances not be taken
to be mutually exclusive. They can in principle be exhaustive.
But because this exhaustive set of nominal categories includes
those with overlapping memberships, it cannot be accurately
summarized through the ELF index and other comparable mea-
sures.
The categories activated in ethnic practice, by contrast,
are often neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. As mea-
sures of either ethnic structure or ethnic practice broadly de-
fined, then, measures that employ these assumptions are mean-
ingless. They distort rather than simplify the empirical world
that they aim to describe and generate uninterpretable re-
sults.
Does this mean that we should not employ the assump-
tions of exclusiveness and exhaustiveness in our measures?
No—but we should recognize that we can only employ these
assumptions to describe specific concepts in specific condi-
tions and interpret our results accordingly. We could, for in-
stance, indeed employ the assumptions of exclusiveness and
exhaustiveness to summarize any single attribute-dimension.
For example, if we were describing India’s ethnic structure, we
could probably come up with mutually exclusive lists of at-
tributes on the attribute-dimensions of tribe, religion, lan-
guage, race, nationality, caste, and region. There may well not
be a single “correct” level of aggregation on these dimen-
sions, and some attributes will belong to multiple dimensions.
But I can imagine some systematic rules that allow us to con-
struct these attribute-dimensions.
This list of attribute-dimensions is likely to include more
than one dimension per country. In the example I just gave,
there are two attribute-dimensions: skin color and place of
origin. In the real world, many countries have multiple attribute
dimensions.  In the case of India, the dimensions I can think of
are at least seven. In the US, they are at least six, including
race, religion, language, region, tribe, and nationality. In Ma-
laysia, similarly, there are at least five, including race, language,
region, religion, and tribe.  We will need, therefore, a statistical
measure of ethnic “structure” which, unlike the ELF index, is
designed to capture this multi-dimensionality. Even if we were
able to design such measures, furthermore, we would need to
modify our interpretations of statistical results. Summarizing
the repertoire of attribute-dimensions in a population’s ethnic
structure is not the same thing as summarizing the repertoire of
ethnic identity categories in a country’s structure.
Alternatively, we might want to consider attribute-dimen-
sions one by one, considering, as Alesina et al. (2003) and
Fearon and Laitin (2003) do, the effect of the dimensions of
language or religion or other such dimensions separately. A
concentration index like the ELF index could be used in this
case, since it eliminates the problem of overlap. But here, too,
we would need to modify our interpretations carefully. Results
generated from a consideration of an individual attribute-di-
mension embedded in a country’s ethnic structure should be
interpreted as narrow results about specific attribute-dimen-
sions—not as general results about “ethnicity.” Further, they
should be interpreted as results about nominal rather than
activated dimensions, since we have no reason to believe that
with each other. To cite just a few examples, the membership of
the categories Hindu, Muslim, Scheduled Caste, Assamese
Tamil, and Jharkhandi overlaps. So does the membership of
the categories Muslim, OBC, Tamil, and Assamese. In Belgium,
the activated categories are Flemish Speakers, French Speak-
ers, Walloons, Brussels, French-speaking Brussels, Native-
Flemish-Belgian, Native-French-Belgian, and German. The cat-
egory Flemish Speakers overlaps with the category Native Bel-
gians, as does the category Walloon.
The Problem of Incompleteness
Is it reasonable to believe that counts of ethnic “groups”
represent an exhaustive description of individuals in a popula-
tion? If by the term ethnic “group” we mean all the nominal
ethnic identities in a country’s ethnic structure in which indi-
viduals are eligible for membership, then the answer is yes. All
individuals have nominal ethnic identities, whether or not they
actually activate them. Thus a population can be described
exhaustively by a count of nominal ethnic identity categories,
although, for the reasons articulated above, this exhaustive
count may consist of overlapping categories.
But if by ethnic “group” we mean the categories activated
in ethnic “practice,” then the answer is no. There is no reason
to expect that all individuals in a population should activate
ethnic identity categories. To illustrate, consider the study of
ethnicity in a Translyvanian town conducted by Brubaker et
al. (2006). This study found that in many contexts, those who
were nominally members of the Romanian ethnic category did
not activate their Romanian ethnic identity, while those who
were of Hungarian ethnicity did. Indeed, in many countries,
including the US, UK, Myanmar, and India, majority groups
often do not activate ethnic identities—the word “ethnic” is
typically reserved for “minorities.”
Indeed, the data in CDEI shows that there are only a few
very polarized countries at particular points in time, such as
Yugoslavia in 1992, where almost the entire population lines
up behind parties activating an ethnic identity—but even in
such countries, the ethnic identification may not be complete.
CDEI shows that 86% of the population in Yugoslavia voted
for ethnic parties in 1992, leaving a minority of voters who
voted for other types of parties. Even if we make the strong
assumption that voting for an ethnic party means activating
an ethnic identity category, this suggests that a significant
proportion of the population did not activate an ethnic iden-
tity category at all. In most countries in the dataset, voters
voted for parties that activated a wide range of categories,
non-ethnic as well as ethnic. In the recent US presidential elec-
tions, for instance, some voters appear to have activated class
identities (e.g., middle-class), others their party identities (Re-
publican or Democrat), others identities based on age (e.g.,
pensioners or young people) and still others their racial identi-
ties (e.g., Black).
Implications of the Problems of
Overlap and Incompleteness for our Measures
The preceding sections argue that if by “ethnic groups”
we mean all the nominal ethnic groups embedded in a country’s
39
Qualitative & Multi-Method Research, Spring 2009
the election date. These include reports from the international
media and translations of local news reports from newspa-
pers, radio and TV. These samples are primary sources that
report what parties are actually saying to voters at the time of
the election. Where the samples are too small to permit reliable
codings, we turn to local newspapers and secondary sources
as a last resort. These sources give us a sample of articles for
the election platform of each party individually.
We code each sample for each party by platform in the
following way: If we find that a political party makes an open
and exclusive appeal to some ethnic category or set of catego-
ries, and that such an appeal is central to its campaign, we
code it as an ethnic party. If we find that a political party makes
an open and inclusive appeal to all ethnic categories that de-
fine a population and makes such an appeal central to its elec-
tion campaign, we code it as a multi-ethnic party. And if we
find that a political party does not make an open or a central
appeal to an ethnic category, whether exclusive or inclusive,
we code it as a non-ethnic party.
Consider the case of India as an example of our coding
procedures. Hundreds of parties competed in India in the 1991
parliamentary elections (the elections closest to but before
1996) but most of them obtained a miniscule percentage of the
vote. We obtained disaggregated data on all parties that ob-
tained at least .01% of the vote, thus including 66 parties in
our dataset. (Note that this means that our dataset excludes
both parties which did not contest a particular election, and
parties that obtained less than .01% of the vote. As such, it
undercounts small and failed parties). We then coded each of
these 66 parties based on a content analysis of its party plat-
form. Of the 66 parties, we coded 13 parties, accounting for
51.81% of the vote, as non-ethnic, 18 parties, accounting for
38.95% of the vote, as ethnic, and were not able to find suffi-
cient articles on election platforms to code the remaining 35
parties, accounting for 10.24% of the vote (these were very
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activated identities fall on a single dimension.4 Finally, they
should be interpreted as results that apply not to ethnic iden-
tity categories themselves, but to the raw materials from which
those categories are generated.
A New Measure: EVOTE
The EVOTE measure is one of those generated from the
CDEI. It measures the total percentage of the vote share ob-
tained by ethnic parties in a given country, taken together, in
the lower-house legislative election closest to 1996 in the 1986–
1996 decade. EVOTE is obtained by aggregating the votes
obtained by individual ethnic parties in a given country (EVOTE
= Vote for Ethnic Party 1 + Vote for Ethnic Party 2 + Vote for
Ethnic Party 3 ….).
This measure is constructed as follows: for each country
included in the dataset, we first obtain a list of parties and vote
shares at as disaggregated a level for the relevant legislative
election. We then classify each political party in each country
for which vote shares are available according to whether it
activates a target category based on ethnicity in several ways:
does it activate ethnicity in its name, in its platform, in its
support base (defined two ways), or in its leadership.
The EVOTE measure discussed here refers entirely to the
votes won by parties that are classified as ethnic by platform.
But in principle, we could construct the same measure by ag-
gregating the votes of parties that are ethnic by name, by
support base (differently defined), and by leadership.
The classification of parties is based on a content analy-
sis of the election campaign of the party in question using four
sources: the Europa World Yearbook, the Political Hand-
book of the World, news sources from FBIS (Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service), and LexisNexis searches. For each
party, we obtain a sample of campaign materials (speeches at
election rallies, policy pronouncements, and so on) as reported
in FBIS and LexisNexis for a period up to three months before
40
Qualitative & Multi-Method Research, Spring 2009
small parties, with a mean vote of .14%).
When a party made an explicit ethnic appeal, we also col-
lected data on the name of its target ethnic category and the
size of the population that each ethnic category constitutes.
In India, for instance, ethnic parties, taken together, explicitly
mobilized the following ethnic categories: Hindus (82%), Mus-
lims (12.12%); Sikhs (1.94%); OBCs (52%), Scheduled Castes
(16.48%), Jharkhandis (3.18%), Assamese (2.64%), and Tamils
(6.6%).
In these data, EVOTE ranges from 0 (in 44 out of 100 cases)
to a maximum of 85.63 (for Yugoslavia in 1992, with Israel in
1992 and Zimbabwe in 1995 close behind), with a mean of 12.95.
The graph below represents the frequency distribution of
EVOTE in these data.
EVOTE is a precise measure of the politicization of ethnic
identities in practice and not simply of ethnic structure. As a
measure of ethnic practice, it does not require the assumptions
that ethnic categories are mutually exclusive and  exhaustive
when they are often not. To illustrate, let’s return to the cat-
egories activated in the 1991 elections in India. Of these, the
categories Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh are mutually exclusive in
relation to each other, but overlap with the categories OBCs,
Scheduled Castes, Jharkhandis, Assamese, and Tamils. The
percentage of the vote captured by ethnic parties also indi-
cates that they do not exhaust the categories activated by the
population: to the extent that the majority of the vote in these
elections went to non-ethnic parties, we must assume that a
significant proportion of the population activated identity cat-
egories other than those defined by ethnic identity.
Given that categories in practice are often neither exhaus-
tive nor mutually exclusive, putting them into the ELF index
yields a nonsensical number. By contrast, EVOTE remains mean-
ingful without these assumptions. The total proportion of the
vote won by ethnic parties is unaffected by whether the ethnic
parties in question mobilize mutually exclusive or overlapping
categories. In India, it so happens that the parties activate
overlapping categories. But the value of EVOTE would be the
same even if the parties in question activated mutually exclu-
sive categories. Similarly, EVOTE also does not impose the
requirement that the categories activated by political parties
be complete, since it is the votes won by the parties that mobi-
lize each category that are added, not the proportion of the
population made up by the categories themselves. Rather, it
allows us to observe such completeness in the data. In coun-
tries in which all individuals activate ethnic identities in their
voting behaviour, the value of EVOTE would be 100%. In coun-
tries in which only some individuals activate ethnic identities
in their voting behaviour, the value of EVOTE would be less
than 100%.
Perfection vs. Interpretability
EVOTE is a narrow measure of the activation of ethnic
identity by political parties in their explicit appeals. I expect to
use EVOTE to examine whether such explicit use of categories
by political parties is associated with breakdown and instabil-
ity. But it is not an all-purpose measure. It conveys no infor-
mation about the effect of other ways in which ethnic identity
categories may be politicized, either through the implicit
behaviour of political parties, or through the behaviour of vot-
ers rather than parties or through the use of ethnic identity in
non-electoral contexts. A study of the relationship between
EVOTE and breakdown and stability, thus, is informative about
the relationship between one aspect of ethnicity and these
variables, but not about all aspects. Designing an array of
such narrow concepts and measures is a more promising strat-
egy to explore the effect of ethnicity than designing a single
all-purpose measure of “ethnicity.”
Even as a narrow measure, EVOTE has plenty of biases
and limitations that need to be corrected for or at a minimum
taken into account in the interpretation of results generated
from it. To cite only two from a long list, it systematically un-
der-counts small parties, and measurement error in the coding
of ethnic parties from which it is generated is correlated with
the size of the party and the region it is from. Using EVOTE for
individual analyses will surely uncover instances of bias and
error that we have not considered so far.  But the main case for
EVOTE—and other measures that abandon the assumptions
of exhaustiveness and exclusiveness—is not that it is perfect,
but that it is interpretable. That is a minimal standard, worth
defending in a field where it is too often ignored.
Notes
1 This article makes arguments developed more fully in an ongoing
book manuscript and introduced in several articles, including Chandra
(2006, 2008, 2009), Chandra and Wilkinson (2008).
2 I use this precisely defined distinction between “nominal” and
“activated” categories rather than the similar-sounding distinctions
“latent” and “salient” ethnic identities, “dormant” and “mobilized
identities, and “commonsensically real” and “politically relevant”
identities (Posner 2004, 2005). Salient or mobilized or politically
relevant identities or group memberships are often taken to mean not
only shared membership but the sharing of some content, such as
common preferences or culture or symbols. But as I use it here,
“activating” an ethnic category simply requires an individual to claim
membership in it—it does not require her to subscribe to its content,
or even necessarily to associate with other members of that category,
although she may also do that.
3 Note that there is nothing “objective” about how we define and
group values on a common dimension. We might just as easily define
as foreign those who are themselves born abroad, or those whose
ancestors in the last 100 years were born abroad, etc. But the main
point here is that we can, and usually do, construct subjective defini-
tions that group attributes into mutually exclusive families. These
attributes then become the raw materials by which nominal and acti-
vated categories are constructed.
4 For a different view, see Posner (2005), which is premised on the
view that activated categories fall into mutually exclusive “category-
sets” or “dimensions.”
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This symposium is on the one hand a testament to the
incredible progress that has been made in the measurement of
social identities, and in particular ethnic identities, over the last
several years; on the other hand, the articles also highlight
how much work is yet to be done.1 Our contribution to this
debate is to focus on content and comparison of social identi-
ties: we make a case for why the content, or meaning, of social
identities matters, and how measuring content will help us with
another major task, which is to be able to make comparisons
across types of identities, e.g., ethnicity, race, caste, religious
association, gender, class, etc. We begin with a discussion of
why content matters and how it is related to the ability to make
comparisons. We then outline the “Identity as a Variable” ana-
lytical framework for measuring the content and contestation
in social identities (Abdelal et al. 2006, 2009) and we discuss
the variety of methodological techniques that can be used to
measure identity content by briefly describing the contribu-
tions to our recently published edited volume, Measuring Iden-
tity: A Guide for Social Scientists, which illustrates several
different ways that scholars have operationalized the mea-
surement of the content of ethnic and other identities.
Why Content Matters
Measurement of ethnic identity means many things. As
Kanchan Chandra points out in this symposium, there is a
theoretically significant difference between nominal and acti-
vated ethnic identities, and the measurement techniques for
addressing each needs to be different. In addition, we can also
add the concepts of groupness and content to what might be
measured by ethnic identity, both of which are analytically
distinct from lists of nominal or activated identities.
“Groupness,” along the lines proposed by Brubaker and
Cooper (2000), describes the degree to which individuals iden-
tify with a group. At a minimum, groupness is merely a di-
chotomous variable—either groupness exists, or it does not
(e.g., the survey question, “Check this box if you are African-
American”). Or, there may be degrees of groupness—measur-
ing how much individuals identify with a given group (e.g.,
the survey question, “How strongly do you identify as Afri-
can-American?”). Whatever way one measures groupness, it
is almost certainly going to fall victim to the problem of over-
lap as discussed by Chandra; that is, the list of groups in a
question is unlikely to capture all the possible identities that a
person might have, or it is likely to treat them as mutually
exclusive. More importantly, the conception of groupness
takes the meaning of a group among its members for granted
and therefore ignores the content of the identity, i.e., the shared
behavioral expectations, goals, views of other groups, and
interpretative processes that constitute the meaning of the
group. In addition, the meaning or content of identity varies
across individuals within groups, and that too is excluded by
the concept of groupness. Hence, the concept of groupness,
by sidestepping the question of content or what the group
means to its members, ignores one of the most theoretically
and empirically significant aspects of social identity.
The content or meaning of social identities, we argue, is
the mechanism which links having an identity to specific be-
havior, to the formation of interests, and to relations with other
groups. For example, if we consider a foreign-born, black, fe-
male, Christian, New Yorker, we need to know the meaning of
all those labels to say anything about this woman’s behavior
(e.g., who she will likely vote for, where she will choose to live,
what languages she will speak, what kind of food she will eat,
what holidays she will celebrate, etc.). The content of her iden-
tities is also the key to her interests and goals, such as which
party she identifies with, whether she values education, which
